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Risk-takinga b s t r a c t
Relationships between Interest (I) and Deprivation (D) type epistemic curiosity (EC) and self-regulation
were evaluated in two studies. In Study 1 (Italians, N = 151), I-type EC correlated positively with positive
outcome-expectancies and risk-taking, but negatively with thinking about negative outcomes. D-type EC
correlated positively with emotional restraint, thoughtful evaluation, and concern over negative out-
comes and potential risks. In Study 2 (Americans, N = 218; Germans, N = 56), I-type EC correlated posi-
tively with behavioral activation, especially fun seeking, whereas D-type correlated negatively with
fun seeking. Neither EC scale correlated significantly with behavioral inhibition. These findings suggest
that I-type EC corresponds to fun, carefree and optimistic approaches to learning, while D-type EC reflects
greater thoughtfulness and caution regarding knowledge-search.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Broadly recognized as playing an important role in intellectual
development, epistemic curiosity (EC) is the motive to seek, obtain
and make use of new knowledge (Berlyne, 1954; Litman, 2005;
Loewenstein, 1994). Individual differences in dispositional tenden-
cies to experience and express EC have been empirically shown to
predict setting self-directed learning goals and the attainment of
intellectual achievements (Litman, Crowson, & Kolinski, 2010;
Richards, Litman, & Roberts, 2013; von Stumm, Hell, &
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). Research on the nature of individual
differences in EC, conducted across a range of ages and cultures,
suggest it is experienced and expressed in two correlated, but
psychologically distinct ways: (1) a desire for new information
anticipated to increase pleasurable feelings of situational interest
(I-type), and (2) a motive to reduce unpleasant experiences of
feeling deprived (D-type) of new knowledge (Huang, Zhou, Wang,
& Zhang, 2010; Litman & Mussel, 2013; Piotrowski, Litman, &
Valkenburg, 2014).
Given I- and D-type EC’s shared association with knowledge-
seeking, unsurprisingly, scores on measures of EC typically show
strong convergence with one another (Mussel, 2010) and with
related constructs (Litman, Collins, & Spielberger, 2005).However, the special nature of EC’s role in self-directed learning
and intellectual achievement is better elucidated by examining
evidence of how I- and D-type EC meaningfully diverge: I-type EC
involves intellectual exploration aimed at the fun of discovering
completely new ideas, while D-type EC reflects an uncomfortably
intense ‘‘need to know,’’ that energizes and directs seeking specific
pieces of information needed to solve for a specific unknown
(Litman, 2008). Supportive of the I/D distinction, each type of EC
has empirically demonstrated unique associations with different
metacognitive judgments, personality traits, affective experiences,
self-directed learning goals, and levels of effort expended towards
learning.
Consistent with I-type’s orientation towards the pleasure of
entirely new discoveries, I-type EC predicts state-curiosity reac-
tions when individuals determine they ‘‘don’t know’’ something
(Litman, Hutchins, & Russon, 2005). It correlates positively with
openness, preference for novelty, tolerance of ambiguity and
expressions of positive affect, but correlates negatively with nega-
tive affective experiences (Litman, 2010; Litman & Mussel, 2013).
I-type EC is found positively associated with setting learning goals
aimed at achieving personal satisfaction (i.e., Mastery-achieve-
ment), but is essentially unrelated to striving for performance-re-
lated achievement (Litman, 2008).
In contrast to I-type EC, and in keeping with D-type’s orienta-
tion towards striving to fill bothersome knowledge-gaps, D-type
EC predicts state-curiosity levels when individuals have partial
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responses to questions) and is associated with more intense curios-
ity-states and more rigorous information-seeking behavior (Litman
et al., 2005; Richards et al., 2013). D-type EC tends to correlate as
much as or more with conscientiousness than openness, correlates
positively with focused attention, impulse-control, and negative
affect, but correlates negatively with ambiguity-tolerance, and is
essentially unrelated to positive affect (Litman, 2010; Litman &
Mussel, 2013; Piotrowski et al., 2014). As to learning goals, D-type
EC is more complex than I-type, showing positive correlations with
mastery-achievement, performance-achievement, and failure-
avoidance, reflecting concern for the accuracy and usability of
new knowledge (Koo & Choi, 2010).
1.1. Epistemic curiosity and self-regulation
As detailed in the previous section, research on individual dif-
ferences in EC suggests that its I- and D-type dimensions each cor-
respond to different underlying processes, different information-
seeking activities, and different self-directed learning goals. An
important implication of these findings is that I- and D-type EC
may also be associated with different self-regulation strategies
applied towards learning and achievement. Self-regulation in this
context refers to the facility with which individuals selectively
apply monitoring and control processes to achieving higher levels
of knowledge and proficiency (Zimmerman, 2002). Indeed, numer-
ous studies of learning and training, spanning a wide range of
domains, have consistently demonstrated that self-regulation is
critical not only to acquiring new knowledge and new skills, but
to the achievement of high-level expertise (Hoffman et al., 2014).
Moreover, self-regulation not only refers to monitoring and
controlling cognitive resources like attention and effort, but also
to modulating emotional experiences aroused while learning
(Balzarotti, Gross, & John, 2010); self-evaluating progress and
formulating expectations about the likelihood of goal-achievement
(Nenkov, Inman, & Hulland, 2008); assessment and management of
potential risks associated with pursuing one’s goals (de Haan et al.,
2011); and valuation of how rewarding new knowledge will be
once learned, which may also impact future learning goals
(Carver, 2006). At present, the nature of the relationships between
the aforementioned self-regulatory factors and I- and D-type EC –
the fundamental motives for learning new knowledge – remain
largely unexplored. Given independent evidence of the importance
of both EC and self-regulation to self-directed learning and
achievement, the direction and magnitude of the relationships
that may exist between EC and self-regulation begs further
consideration.
Previous research suggests that I-type EC is associated with an
open, positive approach towards learning, implying a broadly opti-
mistic outlook regarding new discoveries. Additionally, acquiring
knowledge capable of satisfying I-type EC places relatively modest
demands on the information-seeker; to sate I-type curiosity-states,
new information merely needs to be engaging, but does not
necessarily need to be useful (i.e., factually accurate and/or facili-
tate understanding), as it does for D-type EC. Although if some-
thing expected to be interesting turned out to be dull, this could
lead to disappointment (Loewenstein, 1994), the extant theory
and research on I-type EC all point to its association with optimis-
tic expectancies about discovery (Maner & Gerend, 2007).
Moreover, given that I-type experiences involve seeking new
knowledge for the inherent joy of it, as well as greater ambigu-
ity-tolerance, the arousal of I-type states is likely to include expec-
tations that new sources of pleasurable intellectual stimulation
may be discovered serendipitously. As such, we would expect
I-type EC to involve uninhibited expressions of positive affect, posi-
tive outcome-expectancies, little apprehension over potentiallynegative outcomes, and an orientation towards having fun while
learning.
Like I-type, we might posit that D-type EC also involves opti-
mism regarding knowledge-search; expending time and energy
to seek out new information must be preceded by the expectation
that one’s efforts will pay off. However, theory and research on the
I/D distinction suggest that D-type EC states can only be satisfied
by the right piece of information – merely discovering any new
knowledge will simply not suffice (i.e., it is not equivalent to
Need for Closure; Litman, 2010); to reduce D-type states, the newly
learned information must be able to accurately resolve an
unknown. Moreover, D-type curiosity-states are theorized to
resemble a ‘‘need-like’’ condition, involving unpleasant feelings
of tension and perplexity, which increase until satisfactorily
resolved. This interpretation is consistent with evidence of positive
relationships between D-type EC and negative affect (Litman,
2010) and D-type’s association with TOT states (Litman et al.,
2005) and the ‘‘tingling, torment, [and] turmoil’’ (Schwartz,
Travis, Castro, & Smith, 2000, p.19) that accompany them. Unlike
I-type EC, D-type does not orient individuals to learn new things
just for the fun of it, but rather underlies wanting to develop a dee-
per, more meaningful understanding of a subject (Richards et al.,
2013).
If the activation of D-type EC produces mild to moderately
negative experiences, for which mitigation has fairly stringent cri-
teria (i.e., new knowledge cannot merely be interesting, it must
facilitate comprehension), then D-type EC may coincide with
greater concerns about potential risks involved in knowledge-
search – i.e., one might expend considerable resources to seek
out and make sense of new knowledge, only to fail in the search
or subsequent sense-making. Failure means wasted resources, con-
tinued uncertainty and sustained negative affect. A greater aware-
ness of the risks associated with expending effort for potentially
‘‘useless’’ information suggests that D-type EC involves lower levels
of optimism about knowledge-seeking, and more consideration of
the risk of negative outcomes. These predictions are highly consis-
tent with previous research that shows D-type EC is associated
with setting both performance-oriented and failure-avoidant goals
(Litman, 2008), and with concerns about the utility of new knowl-
edge (Koo & Choi, 2010). Further, given recent findings that indi-
cate D-type EC is positively correlated with impulse-control (e.g.,
Piotrowski et al., 2014), we would also expect D-type EC to be
associated with greater deliberation and caution before exerting
effort to obtain new information.
Consequently, in regard to self-regulation, we would predict D-
type EC to be positively associated with careful evaluation, con-
sideration of negative outcomes, emotional restraint, and prudent
assessment of potential risks in knowledge-seeking. However, it
is important to note that D-type EC, like I-type, is theorized and
empirically shown to reflect an approach orientation; thus, any
hesitation associated with D-type EC should not result in avoid-
ance, but rather, thoughtful and wary approach. Indeed, previous
research on D-type EC has shown it to be associated with more
intense curiosity-states and more knowledge-seeking behavior
(Litman et al., 2005), suggesting that D-type EC should correspond
to drive-like approach, at least once one determines that initiating
knowledge-search is warranted.
1.2. The present studies
Previous work on the I/D distinction suggests there may be dif-
ferent self-regulatory strategies uniquely associated with each
expression of EC, but these relationships remain unexplored.
Thus, the major goal of the present studies was to examine
relationships between I- and D-type EC and several self-regulatory
processes: emotional regulation, risk assessment, outcome
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Given that previous research has demonstrated considerable
cross-cultural stability in EC as a psychological construct, to further
explore the extent to which EC and relevant self-regulatory phe-
nomena are universally experienced and expressed, we examined
these relationships in three cultures/languages (Italian,
American-English and German) using translations of the I/D EC
scales found equivalent to one another by native bilingual speakers
in regard to interpretation, factor structure, internal-consistency,
and major correlates, even with different ‘‘trait-like’’ rating for-
mats/response ranges (Litman & Mussel, 2013; Litman & Silvia,
2006), along with available translated and validated measures of
the aforementioned self-regulatory domains.
In keeping with previous work on the I/D distinction, we
hypothesized that I-type EC would correlate positively with opti-
mistic outcome-expectancies, willingness to take risks, and overall
approach-orientation, particularly in regard to fun-seeking, but
would have little relation to thoughtful evaluation or emotional
restraint. In contrast, D-type EC was hypothesized to be associated
with deliberation, emotional control, and concern over potential
risks. In keeping with past research showing that D-type EC is
associated with higher levels of effort and persistence, and has
more demanding criteria for satiation, D-type EC was expected to
have a stronger relationship to drive-related approach as compared
to I-type, and to be either negatively or un- correlated with fun-
seeking. As both EC scales assess approach-tendencies, it was
hypothesized that the scales would be about equally related to
reward-responsiveness, and that neither EC scale would correlate
with avoidance.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
In Study 1, 151 Italian undergraduates (N = 113 female; M
age = 24.45, SD = 2.91) were recruited from psychology courses at
University of Rome, Italy. In Study 2, 218 American undergraduates
(N = 167 female; M age = 20.81, SD = 2.51) and 56 German under-
graduates (N = 47 female; M age = 20.95, SD = 3.07) were recruited
from psychology and general education classes at University of
Oklahoma, USA, and University Würzburg, Germany. Although
our participants were ‘‘convenience’’ samples, all of the uni-
versities from which they were recruited were public and in large
cities, and thus all respondents were considered reasonably repre-
sentative of young, educated adults from their native cultures.
However, all three samples consisted mostly of women (roughly,
77%), and the Italian sample was significantly older than the other
two (t’s > 1.96, p < .05). Although we had no specific hypotheses
concerning gender or age in regard to the I/D distinction, given
these differences we conducted exploratory analyses and found
no significant correlations.2.2. Study 1 instruments (Italian language)
I- and D-type EC (Litman, Lauriola, & De Santis, 2014, a
range = .70–.78.) was assessed with a 5-item I-type scale (‘‘I enjoy
exploring new ideas’’), and a 5-item D-type scale (‘‘I can spend
hours on a single problem because I just can’t rest without know-
ing the answer’’). Respondents indicated on a 4-point trait-scale
how frequently they generally felt as each item described
(1 = almost never; 4 = almost always).
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Balzarotti et al., 2010, a
range = .72–.84) consists of a Cognitive Reappraisal scale that
assesses reinterpreting events to change one’s emotions (‘‘When I
want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinkingabout the situation’’), and Expressive Suppression, which measures
restraining emotional expression (‘‘When I am feeling negative
emotions, I make sure not to express them’’). For each item, a 7-
point scale was used (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Elaboration on Potential Outcomes scales (EPO; Nenkov et al.,
2008, a range = .80–.94) assess tendencies to consider positive
and negative consequences of one’s behavior through:
Generation/Evaluation of potential outcomes (‘‘I try to anticipate
as many consequences of my actions as I can’’), Positive Outcome
Focus (‘‘I keep a positive attitude that things always turn out all
right’’), and Negative Outcome Focus (‘‘I am often afraid that things
might turn out badly’’). For each item, respondents used a 7-point
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
RT-18 (de Haan et al., 2011, a range = .74–.80) uses dichoto-
mous-response items to assess Risk-Taking Behavior (‘‘I sometimes
like to do things that are a little frightening’’) and Risk Assessment
(‘‘I usually think about all the facts in details before I make a deci-
sion’’, reverse scored). Higher scores on both scales reflect stronger
tendencies to take risks.
2.3. Study 2 instruments
I/D EC scales: Two translations of the I/D EC sales, one in
American-English and one in German, both equivalent to the afore-
mentioned Italian version. The American-English I- and D-type
scales (Litman, 2008, a ranges = .82–.88) used the same trait fre-
quency-rating format as the Italian version; the German transla-
tion (Litman & Mussel, 2013, a ranges = .77–.83) used a 7-point
trait-metric, that assessed how well each item generally described
respondents (1 = not very descriptive; 7 = very descriptive).
Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS;
Carver & White, 1994, a range = .66–.74; Randler, Baumann, &
Horzum, 2014, German version, a range = .45–.77). The BIS mea-
sures regulation of avoidance (‘‘I feel worried when I think I have
done poorly at something important’’) while the BAS measures reg-
ulation of appetitive motives and approach. The BAS comprises
three subscales that measure Drive (‘‘When I want something I
usually go all-out to get it’’), Fun Seeking (‘‘I will often do things
for no other reason than that they might be fun’’), and Reward
Responsiveness (‘‘When good things happen to me, it affects me
strongly’’). Responses to each item were made on a 4-point scale
(1 = very false for me; 4 = very true for me.)
2.4. Procedures and data analytic strategies
For each sample, data were collected either individually or in
small groups, with completion times of 30–40 min; all procedures
complied with regulations regarding privacy and ethical research
standards. In keeping with previous research on the I/D distinction,
we examined both the zero-order and partial correlations, in order
to clarify both shared and unique relations between each EC scale
and its correlates. While decisions regarding hypotheses were
based primarily on evidence of statistical significance using a con-
ventional p < .05, we also considered magnitude and direction of
relationships, regardless of significance. As noted previously, no
significant correlations were found for age or gender; thus, we con-
ducted all analyses on the total sample for each cultural group.3. Study 1 results (Italians)
Means, standard deviations, alphas, zero-order and partial
correlations between the I-and D-type EC scales, the ERQ, the
EPO and the RT-18 scales are reported in Table 1. Alphas were
acceptable (P.70) for all the measures. As expected, the I/D scales
correlated positively with one another, although the magnitude
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, alphas, zero-order and partial correlations between the I-
and D-type EC scales and measures of self-regulation (N = 151; Italians).
M (SD) a Zero-order r Partial r
I-type D-type I-type D-type
I-type EC 15.80 (2.81) .78
D-type EC 12.60 (2.96) .72 .18
ERQ Cognitive
Reappraisal
4.86 (0.96) .81 .15 .11 .13 .08
ERQ Expressive
Suppression
3.04 (1.26) .76 .07 .20 .12 .21
EPO Generation/
Evaluation
31.74 (5.85) .87 .13 .33 .07 .32
EPO Positive
Outcome Focus
14.44 (4.07) .83 .30 .09 .32 .16
EPO Negative
Outcome Focus
15.94 (5.65) .89 .16 .23 .22 .27
RT-18 Total Scale 21.02 (4.11) .81 .31 .09 .34 .16
RT-18 Risk
Taking Behavior
13.25 (2.73) .80 .40 .02 .41 .06
RT-18 Risk
Assessment
7.77 (2.25) .75 .08 .18 .12 .20
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
EPO = Elaboration on Potential Outcomes.
RT-18 = Risk Taking Questionnaire.
Partial r corresponds to the statistical control of the other EC scale.
r P .18 are significant and in bold, p < .05.
Fig. 1. Plot of the interaction of BIS and BAS on D-type EC for Americans (N = 218).
BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale.
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sized, D-type EC correlated positively with Expressive
Suppression and Generation/Evaluation; I-type was not signifi-
cantly related to either. Consistent with our hypotheses, I-type
EC correlated positively with Positive Outcome Focus and nega-
tively with Negative Outcome Focus; the opposite pattern of
correlations was found for D-type. Also as hypothesized, I-type
EC was positively correlated with Risk Taking, but was not signifi-
cantly associated with Risk Assessment, although the positive
direction suggests less concern with risk. As hypothesized, D-type
EC correlated negatively with Risk Assessment, indicating greater
concern with risk.4. Study 2 results (Americans and Germans)
Means, standard deviations, alphas, zero-order and partial
correlations between the American-English and German I- and D-
type EC scales, with corresponding BIS and BAS translations, are
reported in Table 2. Alphas were acceptable for most of the mea-
sures, but lower than optimal for the German BAS, particularly
Reward Responsiveness. This result mirrors past research, which
has found that while the German BIS/BAS are valid and comparable
to their English counterparts, their alphas tend to be lower (c.f.,Table 2
Means, standard deviations, alphas, zero-order and partial correlations between the I- and D
(N = 56, right of diagonal).
M (SD) a
I-type EC 14.35/5.43 (3.04/0.90) .85/.7
D-type EC 11.14/4.60 (3.051.21) .87/.7
BIS Total 2.01/3.01 (0.39/0.45) .71/.7
BAS Total 3.93/3.02 (0.68/0.30) .87/.6
BAS Reward Responsive 1.74/3.26 (0.23/0.36) .85/.5
BAS Drive 1.15/2.80 (0.24/0.44) .71/.5
BAS Fun Seeking 1.61/2.94 (0.23/0.48) .64/.6
BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale.
BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale.
Partial r corresponds to the statistical control of the other EC scale.
For American-English scales, r P .14 are significant and in bold, p < .05; for German scaRandler et al., 2014). In both samples, as hypothesized, neither
EC scale correlated significantly with BIS. As expected, I-type EC
correlated positively with total BAS for both samples.
Correlations with the BAS subscales were significant for
Americans, but not Germans, although the direction was as
expected. As hypothesized, for both samples, I-type EC correlated
positively with Fun Seeking and Reward Seeking for both samples,
whereas D-type EC correlated negatively. Although D-type EC’s
negative relationship with Fun Seeking was as expected, the mag-
nitude and direction of relationships with the other BAS subscales
was unexpected, and the lack of any relationship with Drive was
contrary to our hypothesis.
Given mixed support for our hypotheses, in keeping with the
Joint Subsystems Hypothesis (Corr, 2004), we explored whether
BIS-BAS interaction effects might elucidate the nature of the
relationships among these constructs. Separate multiple regres-
sions were computed for each EC scale; although no significant
interactions were found in the German sample, a significant BIS-
BAS interaction effect was found for D-type EC for the Americans
(b = 0.57, SE = 0.20, t = 2.83, p < .01). As illustrated in Fig. 1,
highest levels of D-type EC were associated with Low BAS + High
BIS, while lowest levels corresponded to Low BAS + Low BIS, sug-
gesting that greater punishment-sensitivity and impulse-control
contribute jointly to D-type EC.
Finally, given differences in sample size and scaling between
the German and American-English EC measures, we conducted z-
tests (Preacher, 2002) to determine whether the correlations dif-
fered significantly in magnitude; only the partial correlations-type EC scales, and BIS and BAS for Americans (N = 218, left of diagonal) and Germans
Zero-Order r Partial r
I-Type D-Type I-Type D-Type
8
5 .56/.40
9 .10/.16 .00./01 .11/.20 .04/.13
9 .38/.39 .04/.16 .40/.36 .13/.07
0 .34/.25 .01/.21 .37/.16 .14/.09
7 .24/.13 .09/.09 .23/.09 .00/.02
5 .36/.45 .00/.05 .40/.51 .17/.27
les, r P .27 are significant and in bold, p < .05.
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However, this finding is difficult to interpret, given that both
correlations were nonsignificant. It is interesting to note that
German BIS/BAS means were all significantly higher than their
English counterparts (t’s> 1.96, p < .05). As these means were simi-
lar in magnitude to those reported previously for each cultural
group (Carver & White, 1994; Randler et al., 2014), this may sug-
gest cultural differences worth exploring in future research (also
see Leone, Perugini, Bagozzi, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2001 regarding
BIS/BAS scores across cultures).
5. General discussion
The present studies examined relationships between I- and D-
type EC and several aspects of self-regulation. In Study 1
(Italians), D-type EC correlated positively with Expressive
Suppression and Generation/Evaluation, whereas I-type was unre-
lated to either, indicating that, as hypothesized, D-type EC involves
emotional-control and deliberation. I-type EC correlated positively
with positive outcome-focus and willingness to take risks but
negatively with negative outcome-focus, consistent with our
hypothesis that I-type involves optimism about new discoveries.
As expected, for D-type EC, the opposite pattern of correlations
with outcome-focus and Risk Assessment emerged, suggesting that
D-type involves concern over potential negative consequences due
to incorrectly comprehending/applying knowledge. One important
implication of these findings is that I-type EC underlies carefree
intellectual exploration, whereas D-type EC orients individuals to
apply cognitive resources judiciously. In future research, it may
be worthwhile to examine whether I- and D-type EC differentially
predict resource expenditure when knowledge-seeking is experi-
mentally constrained (e.g., place limits on question-asking).
In Study 2 (Americans, Germans), as hypothesized, neither I-
nor D-type EC correlated with BIS. I-type EC correlated positively
with Fun Seeking, further demonstrating that I-type EC involves
exploring new information for the intrinsic joy of it. By contrast,
D-type EC showed small negative correlations with Fun Seeking,
suggesting D-type might motivate eschewing information deemed
frivolous in nature. This finding is consistent with past research
that suggests D-type EC orients individuals to seek knowledge
expected to be useful for resolving unknowns. However, the lack
of positive correlations between D-type and Drive or Reward
Responsiveness was unexpected. Possibly, these BAS dimensions
involve impulsivity (Smillie, Jackson, & Dalgleish, 2006), which is
at odds with D-type’s association with impulse-control.
Additionally, these BAS items emphasize intense positive affect
(e.g., ‘‘excited’’, ‘‘energized’’), which may be unrelated to D-type
experiences. Consistent with this interpretation, we found that
impulse-control and punishment-sensitivity (i.e., Low BAS + High
BIS) interacted to jointly influence D-type experiences (Corr,
2004). An important implication of these findings is that while
the (uncomfortable) arousal associated with D-type states might
be more intense relative to I-type, activation of D-type EC might
not quite reflect ‘‘drive-like’’ experiences as previously hypothe-
sized – at least not in a single ‘‘burst’’ – but might be more pre-
cisely understood as prolonged, moderately intense emotional-
motivational states that underlie sustained intellectual activity and
concentration. Beginning in early childhood, controlling impulsivity
when distressed is important for sustaining attention and for the
development of conscientiousness (Eisenberg, Duckworth,
Spinrad, & Valiente, 2014) – all of which correspond to D-type EC.
5.1. Cultural similarities and differences in EC
Besides being one of the first studies to investigate relationships
between EC and self-regulation, this study is also novel in that itwas cross-cultural. Two themes seemingly shared across cultures
was that I-type reflected a carefree approach to learning, while
D-type involved thoughtfulness and caution. Of course, these inter-
pretations should be considered tentative, given that not all
aspects of the study could be fully examined cross-culturally due
to limitations in available validated translations for all measures.
Despite these caveats, the results of the present studies should still
hold considerable value for scholars and practitioners in that they
identify potentially important themes in EC and self-regulation, as
well suggest potential differences between American and German
approach/avoidance tendencies.
5.2. Limitations and future research
First, different measures of self-regulation were used in Study 1
and Study 2; to elucidate our results’ meaningfulness, it will be
important to conduct further cross-cultural investigations of EC
and self-regulation. Second, although our participants were dispro-
portionately composed of women. As gender was uncorrelated
with EC, we do consider this to be a major drawback, although in
future research it would be preferable to examine these phenom-
ena with a more even gender-distribution. Third, there were sev-
eral weaknesses in our German sample (e.g., small N, different
trait-rating for EC scales). However, as the direction of relation-
ships between the German measures was generally consistent with
hypotheses, these data still offer further evidence of the universal-
ity of the I/D distinction, but should be interpreted cautiously.
Finally, the relevant constructs were examined outside of ‘‘real-
world’’ contexts (e.g., classrooms, jobsite-training sessions).
Follow-up research in this vein may better inform educators of
ways to structure learning-environments such that individuals
may more effectively apply their time, energy and ability to intel-
lectual achievement.
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